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Abstract—Ad hoc networks operate mostly over open environ-
ments and are hence vulnerable to a large number of threats.
This calls for providing advanced intrusion detection. To meet
this requirement, we introduce IDAR, a signature- and log-based
distributed intrusion detector dedicated to ad hoc routing protocols.
Contrary to existing systems that observe packets, IDAR analyses
the logs generated by the OLSR protocol and identifies patterns
of misuse. This detector copes with the resource-constraints of
devices by providing distributed detection. In particular, depending
on the level of suspicion/gravity involved, in-depth cooperative
investigation is launched. Simulation shows limited bandwidth
usage, high detection and low false positives.
Index Terms—Intrusion detection, MANETs, routing protocols,
misuse.
I. INTRODUCTION
Securing ad hoc networks is challenging because these net-
works rely on an open medium of communication. In addition,
they are cooperative by nature and hence lack of centralized
security enforcement points, e.g., routers, from which preven-
tive strategies are launched. Thus, traditional ways of securing
networks relying on e.g., firewall, should be enriched with reac-
tive mechanisms, e.g., intrusion detection system. Towards this
goal, we survey the attacks targeting the Optimized Link State
Routing (OLSR) routing protocol [1]; its central role consisting
in determining multi-hops paths among the devices, designates
this protocol as one of the favorite targets for attackers. We
detail each attack, relying on a formalism that captures the
complexity and temporal dependencies between each of the
constituting sub-tasks. While describing an attack, we attempt
to circumvent the general form of this attack so as to keep to
a minimum intrusion detections that fail due to slightly varying
attacks. Based on these modeled attacks, we further implement
one attack to which our detection system is challenged. Recent
works show that intrusion may be identified as a deviation of
the correct behavior (anomaly detection); this correct behavior
is either hand-specified relying on a protocol description, e.g.,
[2] or automatically built/analyzed using machine learning or
data mining techniques, e.g., [3]. The difficulty inherent in au-
tomatically modeling the behavior of dynamic routing protocols
leads to many false positives, which can be reduced by coupling
automatic and specification-based anomaly detection [4]. An
alternative describes the way the intruder penetrates the system
(by establishing intrusion signature) and detects any behavior
that is close to that signature. Little attention - to the best of our
knowledge, only couple of works [5], [6] - focuses on signature-
based detection in ad hoc networks.
We propose IDAR, a signature-based Intrusion Detector dedi-
cated to Ad hoc Routing protocols. The general idea lies in tak-
ing advantage of the audit logs that are generated by the routing
protocol so as to detect intrusion attempts. While not requiring
changes in the implementation of the routing protocol, IDAR
does not necessitate inspecting the traffic as it is the case with
other (aforementioned) systems. Main challenges come from the
need to keep to a minimum the number of investigations along
with the computational load related to the identification of intru-
sions. This calls for proposing a lightweight intrusion detection
that copes with the cooperative nature of ad hoc networks and
the resource constraints of mobile devices. Towards this goal,
we propose a distributed and cooperative intrusion detection
system that parses log as close as possible to the device that
generates it so as to diminish remote communications. Based on
the parsed logs, intrusion detection takes place. This consists in
identifying patterns of events that characterize intrusion attempts.
In practice, a sequence of relevant events are extracted from
logs and are matched against intrusion signatures. In order to
minimize the number of investigations, events are categorized.
Then, depending on their level of criticality, distributed and co-
operative investigation might be conducted. We further evaluate
the performance of the proposed system.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We first
survey attacks on ad hoc routing protocols (§II). Based upon the
defined intrusion signatures, we present IDAR (§III) and evaluate
its performance (§IV). Then, we conclude with a summary of
our results along with directions for future works (§V).
II. VULNERABILITIES
Ad hoc routing protocols constitute a key target for attackers
because: (i) no security countermeasure is specified/implemented
as a part of the published RFCs, (ii) the absence of a centralized
infrastructure complicates the deployment of preventive mea-
sures e.g., firewalls, and (iii) devices operate as routers, which
facilitates the manipulation of messages and more generally
the compromising of the routing. We hereafter illustrate our
presentation by exemplifying attacks on a proactive protocol,
OLSR [1].
A. Background on OLSR
OLSR aims at maintaining a constantly updated view of the
network topology on each device. One fundamental principle
is the notion of multipoint relay (MPR): each device selects a
subset of 1-hop neighbors, the MPRs, that are responsible for
forwarding the control traffic. The idea is to select the minimum
number1 of MPRs that cover 2-hops neighbors so as to reduce
the number of nodes retransmitting messages and hence keep
to a minimum the bandwidth overload. In practice, a node N
selects MPRs among the 1-hop neighbors that are announced
in periodic heartbeat messages, termed hello messages. Then,
a Topology Control (TC) message intended to be diffused in
the entire network, is created by the selected MPR(s). In this
message, a MPR declares the nodes (including N ) that selected
itself to act as a MPR. Then, any device can compute the shortest
1Redundant MPRs may be selected to increase the availability.978-1-4577-1379-8/12/$26.00 ©2012 IEEE
TABLE I
NOTATIONS
Communication
Y
CMt−−−→ X At t, Y sends a control message CM that is received by X
Y
CMt−−−→ Y sends a control message CM at t Y 6 CMt−−−→ Y does not send a control message CM at t
CMt−−−→ X X receives a control message CM at t 6 CMt−−−→ X X does not receive a control message CM at t
Parameters & Messages
CM Control Message 4t Period of time
path, represented as a sequence of MPRs, to any destination.
In addition, recent versions of the specification support a node
holding several network interfaces which are declared (if many)
in a so-called MID (Multiple Interface Declaration) message.
This message is broadcasted regularly by MPRs so that one
another maps multiple interfaces with a main address. Thus,
a unique identification is provided. Additional extensions have
been devised in compliance with the above-summarized core
functions. Examples include (i) dealing with the nodes that
commit (or not) to carry the traffic for others, and (ii) supporting
the interconnection of an OLSR MANET with another routing
domain. With the former, nodes advertise their willingness to
carry/forward traffic. With the latter, OLSR is extended to import
(and resp. export) the routes provided by other routing protocols
(resp. OLSR). In particular, any gateway with associated host(s)
and/or network(s) generates periodically a HNA (Host and
Network Association) message including those host(s) and/or
network(s) (i.e., the related network address and netmask); this
message being further disseminated by MPRs. Overall, these
core and auxiliary functionalities are together subject to various
attacks.
B. Attacks Targeting OLSR
OLSR is vulnerable to a wide range of attacks, which are here-
after sub-classified according to the action which is undertaken
on the routing [7]:
- Drop attacks consist in dropping routing message(s).
- Active forge attacks generate novel and deceptive routing
message(s).
- Modify and forward attacks modify a received routing
message(s) before forwarding it.
These above attacks are further formulated according to the
model introduced in [8]. This model specifies the relationship
between actions that compose an attack as well as their related
consequences. We further enrich this model with temporal anno-
tations (Table I). Therefore, complex attacks, their constituting
actions and consequences are temporally depicted and catego-
rized.
Drop attack comes from a node that drops a message instead of
relaying it. Threatened messages are restricted to the messages
that are created and relayed by MPR, i.e., TC, MID, and HNA
messages. Consider a host H that sends a message which
intended to be forwarded. This message is received by I that
drops it. In practice, I drops a message if I does not forward
it within the maximum allowed period. Convenient drop is due
to a packet that is empty, expired (as indicated by the time to
live field), duplicated or out of sequence. In addition, restrictive
forwarding may apply; only the MPR(s) forward messages.
Otherwise, remaining drops come from either a selfish/faulty
node or an attacker. An attempt to drop any packet is termed
black hole whereas selective dropping is named gray hole.
Rather than dropping traffic, an opposite behavior consists in
introducing falsified routing information.
Active forge comes from a node that injects novel and deceptive
routing messages. Among others, the broadcast storm aims at
exhausting resources (e.g., energy). For this purpose, an intruder
I forges a large number of control messages CM within a short
period of time. This attack may be conducted in a distributed
manner with several nodes colluding so as to emit (a large
number of) messages. In order to reduce the visibility of this
attack, I typically masquerades itself. In practice, masquerading
lies in sending a message CM including a switched identification
S (I
CM(I)−−−−→, I CM(S)−−−−−→). Note that this case should be distin-
guished from a node that holds several interfaces and advertises
them in the dedicated MID message. Apart from masquerading,
identity spoofing may be intended to create conflicting route(s)
and potentially loop(s). This spoofing attack may also be coupled
with a modification of the willingness field so as to impact the
selection of MPR. MPRs are selected among the nodes with
the highest willingness and in case of multiple choices, the
node providing a reachability to the maximum number of 2-
hops nodes is primarily selected. For instance, a node whose
willingness attribute set to will never (resp. will always),
is never (resp. always) selected as a MPR. In addition, active
forges cover the message tempering with incorrect adjacent
links (hello messages), topology information (TC messages), and
network interfaces (MID) and routes (HNA messages). With the
former, I forges at t′ a hello message, which declares 1-hop
and symmetric neighbors NS′I differing from the real one NSI :
I
hello(NS′I)t′−−−−−−−−→ S,NS′I 6= NSI ⇒ I ∈ I. When forging NS′I ,
the attacker has 3 options:
- declaring a non-existing node as a symmetric neighbor,
implies that I (or another misbehaving node) is further
selected as a MPR (Expression 1): if I advertises a non-
existing node N (N /∈ N with N defining the set of
nodes composing the OLSR network), I ensures that no
other (well-behaving) MPR claims being a 1-hop symmetric
neighbor of N . Recall that MPRs are selected so that all the
2-hops and symmetric neighbors are covered, I is selected
as a MPR.
S
hello(NSS)t−−−−−−−−→, I hello(NS
′
I)t′−−−−−−−−→ S, |t′ − t| < 4t,
∃N ∈ NS′I 3: N /∈ N ∩NSI
⇓
I ∈ I,∃I ′ ∈ I ∩NSS 3: I ′ ∈MPRS ,
Card(NS′I\NS′I ∩N ) > 0.
(1)
This is verified as long as no other misbehaving neighbor
of S claims the same. Overall, inserting at least one non-
existing neighbor (∃N ∈ NS′I 3: N /∈ N∩NSI ) guaranties
that a misbehaving node I ′ (with I ′ ∈ I) is selected to act
as a MPR of S (∃I ′ ∈ I ∩ NSS 3: I ′ ∈ MPRS). In
addition to the above, the connectivity of I increases.
- declaring that an existing node is a symmetric 1-hop neigh-
bor whereas it is not the case (∃X ∈ NS′I ∩ N 3: X /∈
NSI ). This claiming increases artificially the connectivity
of I , i.e., Card((NS′I\[NS′I∩NSI ])∩N ) > 0. If no (well-
behaving) MPR covers S (@A ∈ N\I 3: A ∈ NSS ∧X ∈
NSA), then at least one misbehaving node is selected as
a MPR of S (∃I ′ ∈ I 3: I ′ ∈ MPRS). This typically
characterizes an attempt to create a blackhole: I introduces
a novel path that provisions the blackhole.
S
hello(NSS)t−−−−−−−−→, I hello(NS
′
I)t′−−−−−−−−→ S, |t′ − t| < 4t,
∃X ∈ NS′I ∩N 3: X /∈ NSI
⇓
I ∈ I,
Card((NS′I\[NS′I ∩NSI ]) ∩N ) > 0,
@A ∈ N\I 3: A ∈ NS ∧X ∈ NA
⇓
∃I ′ ∈ I 3: I ′ ∈MPRS .
(2)
- omitting an existing 1-hop symmetric neighbor P (∃P ∈
NSI 3: P /∈ NS′I ), decreases artificially the connectivity
of both P and I (NSI * NS′I ):
S
hello(NSS)t−−−−−−−−→, I hello(NS
′
I)t′−−−−−−−−→ S,
|t′ − t| < 4t,∃P ∈ NSI 3: P /∈ NS′I
⇓
I ∈ I,∃I ′ ∈ I ∩NSS , NSI * NS′I .
(3)
Overall, such a falsification of the neighboring adjacency per-
verts the topology seen by S and may impacts the selection of
MPR(s) of S. Another alternative refers to a node I declaring
itself as a MPR although it has not been selected as a MPR
forehand: I forges a (TC) message including incorrect 1-hop
symmetric neighbor(s), including at least the MPR selector(s)
that corresponds to the neighbors that have selected I as a
MPR. Let AI represents this set advertised in the TC message.
This attack consists in I advertising an incorrect A′I differing
from the real one AI : I TC(A
′
I)t−−−−−−→ S,A′I 6= AI ⇒ I ∈ I. In
particular, possible falsifications lie in inserting a non-existing
node or an incorrect but existing node or also omitting a node
S belonging to AI . Due to the lack of space, we do not detail
herein each of these cases. Upon the reception of a falsified TC
message, routing tables are corrupted and may contaminate any
interconnected routing domain if a gateway exports those OLSR
routes. Note that the gateway may also forge itself wrong routes.
This attack constitutes a generalization of the previously-defined
forging of corrupted TC messages: a node advertises either non-
existing or existing but unreachable nodes, or omitting adver-
tising reachable nodes. Symmetrically, an intruder may import
incorrect routes to the OLSR domain. Overall, the forge attacks
(e.g., route spoofing attacks) necessitate to tamper message while
keeping it syntactically correct. In other words, bogus messages
can be forged, hence creating implementation-dependent effects.
Generally speaking, similar tampering may be performed by a
MPR relaying control messages.
Modify and forward attacks are characterized by an intermedi-
ate that captures the control message and replays or/and modifies
this message before forwarding it. Replaying a message includes
delaying (i.e., forwarding latter potentially in another area) and
repeating this message. As a result, routing tables are updated
with obsolete information. Both attacks can be performed in a
distributed manner with two intruders: one recording the message
from one region so as to replay it in another region (i.e., the
one of the colluding intruder); this leads to the creation of a
wormhole. In order to stay invisible, both intruders may keep
the identification field unchanged: the source is still S. Note that
sequence numbers constitute a standard mechanism that provides
protection against replay attacks. Based on those numbers, a
node identifies freshest information, prevents duplicates and re-
playing while indicating insertion/deletion. In counterpart, there
usage may be hijacked. For instance, an intruder I may forwards
the message including an increased sequence number. Thus, the
source assumes that I provides the freshest route.
III. INTRUSION DETECTION
In order to deal with such attacks, we propose IDAR, a dis-
tributed, log- and signature-based intrusion detection system that
periodically collects the OLSR logs. These logs characterize the
activities of OLSR (e.g., packet reception, MPR selection). Note
that additional logs, e.g., system-, security-related logs, could
be integrated and correlated. Once parsed, a log is used so as to
detect a sign of suspicious activity. This consists in matching
the log against predefined signatures; a signature is thought
as a partially ordered sequence of events that characterizes a
misbehaving activity. Detection is potentially not only a mem-
ory but also a bandwidth-consuming: it may involve not only
examining logs but also requesting others to collect/correlate
additional intrusion evidences. Thus, this activity should be
carefully-planned, i.e., initiated only when sufficient suspicion
exists and terminated as soon as a result is obtained. Toward this
goal, evidences are classified so that depending on their level of
gravity, additional in-depth detection might be performed. They
fall into the following groups:
- Suspicious-evidence-group contains the evidences necessary to
identify a node as suspicious,
- Initial-evidence-group contains the evidences necessary to
identify a suspicious node & launch a networked investigation,
- Confirming-evidence-group contains the evidences that confirm
the occurrence of an attack. This results in terminating the
investigation and declaring the suspicious node as an intruder.
- Canceling-evidence-group contains the evidences that eliminate
the suspicion, which ends the investigation.
These groups are populated with the evidences extirpated from
logs. If an evidence belonging to the initial-evidence-group is
discovered then an advanced investigation is launched so as
to confirm (Confirming-evidence-group) or infirm (canceling-
evidence-group) intrusion; both resulting in terminating the
investigation. Relying on these groups, the gradual evolving of
the attack and of its related detection are easily followed. In
addition, its compact form facilitates the lightweight discovering
of long-terms intrusions. But before delving into the functioning
of the above groups, let first exemplify the proposed intrusion
detection system with the link spoofing attack we purposely
developed.
A. Link Spoofing Signature
Link spoofing lies in falsifying hello message(s) so as to
modify the topology perceived by adjacent nodes and confer to
the attacker the ability to isolate node(s) and/or the MPR position
permitting to e.g., mis-relay. The link spoofing (Expression 4)
we developed takes the following form:
- non-existing and symmetric node(s) (∃N ∈ NS′I 3: N /∈
N ∩ NSI ) are advertised by the intruder I . This attack
guaranties2 that I is selected as a MPR because I is the
only MPR that covers the non-existing node3.
- advertises existing but non-neighboring node(s). In partic-
ular, I announces common neighbors with another node
L adjacent to S, I increases the probability that L is not
selected as a MPR (I replacing L) and henceforth increases
its proper ascendancy.
- does not advertise neighboring and symmetric node(s).
A drawback is that it decreases the connectivity of the
malicious MPR, which does not facilitate its selection. For
this purpose, we ignored this case although the signature
deals with it. This attack decreases the connectivity of
node(s).
S
Hello(NSS)t−−−−−−−−→ I, I Hello(NS
′
I)t′−−−−−−−−−→ S, |t′ − t| < 4t,
∃N ∈ NS′I 3: N /∈ N ∩NSI ,
∃L ∈MPRS 3: [NSL\NSI ] ⊆ [NS′I\NSI ]
⇓
I ∈ I, L /∈MPRS ,
∃I ′ ∈ I 3: I ′ ∈MPRS ,
Card(NS′I\[NSI ∩N ]) > 0,
Card(NS′I\NSL) > 0.
(4)
B. Cooperative Investigation
Link spoofing aims at inflecting the MPR selection; such
selection is triggered upon a change in the symmetric 1- and 2-
hops neighbors. Rather than launching an in-depth investigation
upon these changes, we minimize the investigation by initiating
it only when the event that occurs is relevant to a link spoofing
attack. We ignore changes in the 1-hop neighborhoods (e.g., node
apparition) because they are observed by the node itself and are
hence not subject to remote falsification; a cornerstone of a link
spoofing. In addition, changes in the 2-hops neighborhood are
considered if they impact the MPR selection. Those include:
- A replaced MPR (Evidence 1, E1 for short) means that
a change in the covering of 1-hop neighbors leads to this
replacement. This comes from 1-hop neighbor(s), possibly
the replacing MPR, that increase(s)/decreases it/their cover-
age(s) to the detriment of the replaced MPR.
- No MPR replacement takes place but a previously-selected
MPR is detected as misbehaving. Messages are dropped,
2unless another attacker advertises the same non-existing node.
3With last version of RFC, a node (that is potentially an intruder) can dictate
its selection as MPR by advertising its willingness to relay messages for others.
forged or misrelayed by that MPR (E2). Overall, a link
spoofing also covers the case wherein an intruder contin-
ues to advertise identical 1-hops neighbors despite recent
changes in the neighborhood. Note that contrary to the
other evidences listed here, this case is not event-driven and
should be handled by launching periodical/random checks.
- a MPR is the only one providing the connectivity to node(s)
(E3).
- a MPR does not cover its adjacent neighbor(s) (E4).
- a MPR provides connectivity to a non-neighbor (E5).
(E1 ∨ E2) , optional(E3)
⇓ ⇓
E4 ∨ E5 (!E4∧!E5)
⇓ ⇓
The suspicious MPR The suspicious MPR
is an intruder. is well-behaving.
(5)
The occurrence of E1 or E2 is the starting point for further
investigation; E1, E2 hence belong to the initial-evidence-group.
Note that a MPR that is the only one providing the connectivity
to node(s) (E3) is suspicious but this condition is not sufficient
to launch an investigation: (i) this situation is typical in a
sparse network and (ii) 2 nodes within communication range
often fail in communicating due to the unpredictable nature
of wireless transmission resulting from, e.g., obstacles, noises.
Thus, diagnosing E3 is especially difficult under no specific
assumption. Overall, the occurrence of either E1 or E2 and
optionally E3 leads to an in-depth investigation. In practice, the
investigator interrogates the 1-hops neighbor(s) of the suspicious
MPR so as to discover whether the suspicious MPR does not
cover its neighbors (E4) or advertises a distant node (E5). If
all the requested nodes confirm (resp. infirm) E4 or E5 , then
the MPR is suspected (resp. well-behaving). Note that, if part
of those requested nodes express a different opinion, which may
result from nodes’ mobility or misbehavior(s), the number of
these nodes and their reputation should be taken into account
(as we plan in our near future work). More precisely, this
Algorithm 1 : Advanced Investigation
1: SuspiciousMPRs= new (MPR)
2: OldMPRs = GetReplaced-MPR();
3: for (suspicious ∈ SuspiciousMPRs) do
4: Common2HopsNeighbors = GetCommon2HopsNeighors(suspicious,
OldMPRs )
5: for (2HopsNeighbor ∈ Common2hopsNeighbors) do
6: if (V erifyLink(2HopsNeighbor, suspicious) == false) then
7: GenerateAlarm(suspicious);
8: Terminate(suspicious);
9: end if
10: end for
11: Cancel(suspicious);
12: SuspiciousMPRs=SuspiciousMPRs - suspicious;
13: end for
investigation (Algorithm 1) is conducted as follows: replacing
MPR(s) and replaced MPR(s) are computed (lines 2, 3); the 2-
hop neighbors that are covered by both are established (line 4)
so as to be interrogated. In practice, this interrogation of a 2-
hops neighbor Ai consists in sending a request to Ai without
going through both the suspicious MPR I or a colliding intruder
I ′j . This avoidance is necessary so as to prevent I and I
′
j from
dropping the request and/or simply forging a defective answer.
For this purpose, a 1-hop neighbor (primarily the MPR) that
covers the requested 2-hops neighbors is provided the request.
If no answer is obtained (i.e., when the related time-out elapses),
then the demand is sequentially transferred through the rest
of the covering 1-hop neighbors (as aforementioned, MPRs
being primarily selected). Note that this verification is performed
within a thread so that the investigation of one node (and the
result waiting) is not blocking to others. If no neighbor is left,
then a (multi-hops) alternative path is researched in the routing
table to reach Ai. If Ai denies the suspicious MPR as 1-hop
neighbor then an alarm is generated and the overall investigation
terminates. Otherwise, if no deny is provided, the suspicious
MPR is well behaving. Note that if no answer is provided about
the suspicious MPR, then the suspicious MPR is tagged as not
verified.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In order to evaluate the performance of IDAR, we simulated
a mobile ad hoc network using the NS3 simulator4. Each
node constituting this simulated network is further virtualized
relying on a LinuX Container virtual machine5 that provides an
operating-system-level virtualization; permitting to run multiple
isolated nodes on a single host and hence, to independently mea-
sure the memory usage. Relying on this platform, simulations
are carried for a duration of 120s on Intel(R) Core(TM) Duo
2.53GHz with each simulated node holding a fedora 12 operating
system. We consider a MANET of N = 25 nodes split into 20
well-behaving nodes and 5 intruders, together communicating
via IEEE 802.11a with a transmission range Tx of 175m.
They move, relying on the so-called RandomWalk2d mobility
pattern provided by NS3: nodes randomly choose directions, and
herein move at the same speed. When a node hits the network
boundaries (unless specified, the network area is defined by
Sx × Sx =400m × 400m), it rebounds in a reflexive angle. We
use OLSR preserving the parameters promoted in the RFC. Data
traffic is further simulated relying on the V4PingHelper of NS3:
each node exchanges 56 bytes echo to one another and waits 1s
before sending it again. We evaluate the performance of IDAR
in terms of intruder detection rate, probability of false positive
and detection overhead; the traffic and memory usage dedicated
to intrusion detection. Performance indicators are evaluated with
regard to the network density (that reflects the scaling properties)
and the mobility. The node density corresponds to the average
number of neighbors defined by N×pi×T
2
x
S2X
in [9]. Figure 1-(a)
shows that the percentage of detected intruders greatly increases
until it stabilizes to a high detection rate (around 96%) and
decreases for a density higher than 21 neighbors. This decrease
comes from a high collision rate which prevents nodes from
efficiently both investigating intrusion and receiving data/routing
traffic. The probability of false positive keeps low but rises
according to the network density (Figure 1-(b)). This comes
from two nodes owning different live-times for a bidirectional
link connecting each other. This can be overcome by amplifying
the period during which those links are considered valid [10].
Varying the mobility (Figure 2) and locking the network density
to 15 neighbors, the percentage of detected intruders and false
positives are quite stable: around 95% of the intruders are
4http://www.nsnam.org
5http://lxc.sourceforge.net
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Fig. 1. Percentage of Detected Intruders and False Positive Rate Depending on
the Network Density
detected with a velocity lower than 8 m/s (i.e., around 28.7
km/h). Then, the detection rate declines and the false positives
rate increases. This comes from the high turnover (and the
resulting losses of connectivity) that prevents from performing
full investigation. Such a high mobility not only prevents from
detecting intrusion but also from communicating over multi-
hops. Additional experiments show that the traffic generated by
IDAR rises according to the network density. That results from
the collisions that imply to re-launch investigation. Nevertheless,
the traffic generated by our system keeps negligible comparing to
the OLSR: around 1.1% (and resp. 11.4%) of the OLSR traffic for
a network density equals to 5 (resp. 10); this leads to a maximum
memory usage corresponding to 8.45 MB (and resp. 19.08 MB).
V. CONCLUSION
Signature- and specification-based detection are unpopular
comparing to anomaly detection. This calls for consolidating
efforts on signature- and specification-based detection while
following the habitus that lies in coupling detection systems
together. To meet this requirement, we define the signatures
of the attacks targeting OLSR. These signatures are utilized
by IDAR, a log-based, distributed intrusion detection system.
IDAR distinguishes itself by analyzing the logs generated by a
routing protocol and extracting intrusion evidences in order to
compare these latter against predefined intrusion signatures. For
this purpose, evidences are categorized into 4 groups according
to their degree of suspicion/gravity and hence to their ability to
activate/deactivate the investigation. We further develop a link
spoofing attack, build the related detection rules, and evaluate
the performances of IDAR relying on the NS3 simulator coupled
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Fig. 2. Percentage of Detected Intruders and False Positive Rate According to
the Mobility.
with virtual machines. Overall, experiments show a high rate
of intrusion detection and low false positive rate even under
increased mobility and density. Meanwhile, memory and band-
width consumption are adapted to resource-constrained devices.
Still, these experiments show that intrusion detection induces
additional activities, hence calling for finding a compromise
between detection accuracy and reduced resource-consumption.
In addition, we envisage coupling IDAR with trust model in
oder to avoid the bad effects of deceptive opinion during the
investigation.
VI. RELATED WORK
Systems that detect intrusions targeting ad hoc routing proto-
cols are diverse in the way they analyze the intrusion. They fall
into 3 categories: anomaly, specification- and signature-based
detection. Anomaly detection constitutes the main approach.
The idea is to define the correct behavior of a node and
detect deviations from this behavior. This correct behavior is
automatically built during an attack-less phase. In [11], attempts
to falsify the routes are detected. During the training phase,
the impact of the movement on the percentage of updates in
the routing table is analyzed. Then, during operation, an actual
percentage of updates differing from the predicted one, is defined
as an anomaly; the distinguish is provided by the Support Vector
Machine (SVM) Light [12] classifier or a rule-based engine
RIPPER [3] . In [13] and resp. [14], a blackhole (and resp.
dropping) attack targeting the AODV protocol (resp. a secured
version of AODV) are detected by investigating features, e.g.,
the number of route requests and route replies as well as the
average difference of sequence numbers6. If the distance between
6Increased sequence numbers are known as a sign of blackhole attack.
observed features and the average ones, exceeds a given thresh-
old, then an intrusion is detected. More sophisticated Cross-
Features Analysis (CFA) [15] is applied relying on the C4.5
[16] decision tree classifier so as to detect both blackhole and
packet dropping on AODV and DSR protocols. CFA and C4.5 are
also used for OLSR [17]. Rather than establishing automatically
a correct behavior, specification-based systems hand-code this
behavior relying on the protocol specification. Then, the system
detects a violation of constraints circumventing this behavior.
Example of constraints defining the correct behavior of OLSR[2],
[4] includes the fact that a MPR and a node that selects the MPR
must be adjacent. These constraints are modeled using semantic
properties [4], rules [2], or finite state machines [10]. Signature-
based detection models the way an intruder penetrates the
system by defining intrusion signatures. Then, any behavior that
is close to this predefined signature is flagged as intrusion. Finite-
state-machine is used to detect network flooding, dropping and
spoofing attacks, which target AODV [6]. Sensors observe the
traffic and match it against predefined signatures. They also
exchange MAC and IP addresses to detect identity spoofing
realized by by a node emitting a packet identified with MAC or IP
addresses differing from those registered. Rule-based signatures
are specified to detect attack on OLSR [5] in opposition to the
legitimate behavior depicted by a prior specification-based IDS
[4]. This detection is further coupled with a trust system: a node
mistrusts another that does not conforms to the predefined rules.
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